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ABSTRACT
The existence of phenotypic heterogeneity in single-species bacte-
rial biofilms is well-established in the published literature. How-
ever, the modeling of population dynamics in biofilms from the
viewpoint of social interactions, i.e. interplay between heterotypic
strains, and the analysis of this kind using control theory are not
addressed significantly. Therefore, in this paper, we theoretically
analyze the population dynamics model in microbial biofilms with
non-participating strains (coexisting with public goods producers
and non-producers) in the context of evolutionary game theory and
nonlinear dynamics. Our analysis of the replicator dynamics model
is twofold: first without the inclusion of spatial pattern, and sec-
ond with the consideration of degree of assortment. In the first
case, Lyapunov stability analysis of the stable equilibrium point of
the proposed replicator system determines (1,0) (‘full dominance
of cooperators’) as a global asymptotic stable equilibrium when-
ever the return exceeds the metabolic cost of cooperation. Hence,
the global asymptotic stable nature of (1,0) in the context of non-
consideration of spatial pattern helps to justify mathematically the
adversity in the eradication of “cooperative enterprise" that is an
infectious biofilm. In the second case, we found non-existence of
global asymptotic stability in the system, and it unveils two ad-
ditional phenomena - bistability and coexistence. In this context,
two inequality conditions are derived for the ‘full dominance of
cooperators’ and coexistence. Therefore, the inclusion of spatial
pattern in biofilms with non-competing strains intends conditional
dominance of pathogenic (with respect to the hosts) public goods
producers which can be an effective strategy towards the control of
an infectious biofilm with the drug-dependent regulation of degree
of segregation. Furthermore, the simulation results of the proposed
dynamics for both the discussed scenario confirm the results of the
analysis of equilibrium points. The proposed stability analysis not
only demonstrate a mathematical framework to analyze the popu-
lation dynamics in biofilms but also gives a clue to control an in-
fectious biofilm, where phenotypic and spatial heterogeneity exist.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The previous idea of the unicellular behavior of microbes has
been metamorphosed into the collective behavioral property [32,
21]. In a natural habitat, bacteria commonly live in a surface-
associated, matrix-enclosed (matrix of extracellular polymeric sub-
stances, EPS), complex differentiated communities, called biofilms
[21]. A plethora of cooperative processes, such as fruiting body for-
mation [32], summative secretion of EPS [6], biosurfactants [29],
virulence factors [37], etc. is required for a microbial community
to remain viable. These collective phenomena are actively con-
trolled and regulated by quorum sensing [26, 15] within a subpop-
ulation of public goods producers, called cooperators [7]. However,
phenotypic heterogeneity among clone-mates is often observed in
biofilms [8]. This heterogeneity primarily controls the ability of
constituent population to produce and use public goods. Coopera-
tors produce public goods at a cost to themselves, whereas defec-
tive strains (defectors) use the produced goods without contribution
to the shared pool [16]. It is naturally expected that defectors will
thrive under evolutionary pressure due to the low cost of survival;
however, the maintenance of cooperation in the colony is supported
by the different mechanisms as discussed in the existing literature
[27, 41, 10]. Spatial pattern formation is one of the existing mech-
anisms towards the persistence of cooperation in biofilms [35, 30,
23]. Although, most of these hypotheses suggest that the syner-
gistic and antagonistic interactions within and in-between of public
goods producers and non-producers primarily regulates the stabil-
ity of biofilms [23].
Population dynamics models depend on retention of public goods
and metabolic cost of public goods production are discussed in [13,
14, 38] for ecological public goods games with constant size and
only with cooperative and defective strains. However, a bacterial
colony comprises other strains than cooperators and defectors [8].
Moreover, a majority of chronic infections [4] are due to pathogenic
biofilms [19, 33]. Therefore, the stability analysis of such biofilms
is an important question to study towards the development of novel
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anti-biofilm drugs [4, 3]. In this paper, we formulate the replicator
dynamics model [11, 2] in microbial biofilms with non-competing
strains [8] in two ways - first without consideration of spatial pat-
tern and secondly include the pattern formation. Further, we ana-
lyze the stability of the equilibrium points of the proposed replica-
tor system using nonlinear control theory [34].
As a result of stability analysis of the proposed system in the
absence of spatial pattern, we obtain the ‘full dominance of coop-
erators’ (i.e. (1,0)) in the colony is only a globally asymptotically
stable equilibrium whenever retention factor [38] is greater than the
cost of cooperation, whereas, (1,0) is a saddle-node whenever cost
exceeds return. Hence, whenever retention exceeds metabolic cost,
the cooperators take over the entire population. On the contrary,
analysis of replicator equation with consideration of the level of
assortment [35] concludes non-existence of global stability in the
system, and it introduces bistability and coexistence. In this con-
text, we derived the inequality conditions for the ‘sole dominance
of producers’ and coexistence. Therefore, the conditional domi-
nance of cooperators in biofilms with non-competing strains and
spatial patterns gives a clue to control pathogenicity via regulation
of degree of assortment. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this
paper presents the first of its kind stability analysis of a replicator
system with and without the inclusion of the degree of segregation
in a combined framework of evolutionary game theory (EGT) and
nonlinear dynamics.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses
the contributions of our work. Section 3 describes the proposed
model, stability analysis of the replicator system without consider-
ation of spatial pattern, and corresponding simulation results. The
global asymptotic stability analysis of the equilibrium point (1,0)
using Lyapunov function candidate is also presented in this section.
Section 4 presents the stability analysis of replicator equation with
the inclusion of spatial pattern. In this section, detailed simulations
of the dynamics for four different cases are also discussed. Sec-
tion 5 concludes the paper with a few inferences & remarks on the
proposed analysis and future scope.
2. KEY CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE WORK
• The interdisciplinary work presented in this paper provides a
mathematical structure in the context of evolutionary game theory
[11, 2] and nonlinear control [34] for rigorous analysis of the so-
cial interactions [36, 23] in both pathogenic and non-pathogenic
biofilms. In general, this study yields a framework for analyzing
multi-order replicator systems.
• Existing literature primarily addresses the problems on popu-
lation dynamics with an assumption of ∑i x˜i = 1, where x˜i is the
population density of the ith competing strain [13, 14]. However,
non-competing strains (as an example “inactive alleles” - metabolic
cost for cooperation, production-reception of quorum molecules
is zero [8]) those who do not actively take part in public goods
game, can be present in the community [12], hence, in this situa-
tion ∑i x˜i < 1. The current work addresses the existence of non-
participating strains in ecological public goods games while ana-
lyzing the evolution of the population. Incorporation of non-comp-
eting strains in the present analysis resembles the actual microbial
population in a better way compares to the system with only co-
operative and defectives strains [8]. Moreover, the presence of
non-participating strains in the colony of cooperators and defectors
gives a scope for rigorous analysis of a second-order replicator sys-
tem in support of understanding the dynamics of individual com-
peting subpopulations separately for different micro-environmental
conditions. Whereas, it could be possible that the first-order repli-
cator system for ∑2i=1 x˜i = 1 misses some crucial happenings in the
population due to the perfectly converse dynamics between com-
peting strains.
• We investigate the stability of replicator equation in general
and also with an effect of the spatial pattern. The first analysis
presents the global stability of the subpopulation of pathogenic co-
operators; hence, it gives a general idea for the adversity in the
eradication of pathogenicity. Secondly, analysis with the degree of
assortment [35] presents a conditional dominance of cooperators
while non-competing strains exist in the colony, and this system
supports bistability and coexistence [14].
• Social interactions in biofilms, between homotypic and het-
erotypic strains, is one of the leading causes of the failure of con-
temporary anti-biofilm drugs towards the eradication of bacterial
infections [18, 42, 17]. We claim that the proposed analysis, based
on the game-theoretic interactions between competing strains, can
contribute in developing a novel antibiotics, which concerns the
eradication of pathogenicity with the regulation of cost of cooper-
ation and degree of assortment - two primary factors involve in the
proposed EGT model.
3. MODEL DESCRIPTION
A subpopulation of cells (cooperators) in biofilms often secretes
costly public goods, whereas non-cooperative strains (defectors)
use the produced goods without contributing to the microbial con-
sortium [16]. Here, x and y are considered as the fraction of cooper-
ators and defectors, respectively, and both x and y are non-negative.
For a microbial colony of only with the subpopulation of producers
and non-producers, x+y = 1 [38]. If total population size is N, the
number of cooperators and defectors are xN and yN, respectively.
However, in this paper, we consider the colony (with constant pop-
ulation size) comprises not only cooperators and defectors but also
has some other strains [12, 8], i.e. x+ y < 1. The assumptions we
have taken here are that the remaining strains (other than producers
and non-producers) in the colony do not contain any public good
producers by any means, and the average fitness of the population is
primarily due to the fitness of cooperators and defectors as the other
strains do not take part (i.e. inactive) in the public good competi-
tion [12, 8]. Therefore, here we consider, non-competing strains do
not produce the costly public goods by themselves as well as do not
receive the benefit from the public goods produced by the cooper-
ators. In this paper, the stability analysis of the proposed replicator
system is discussed in twofold: first, without consideration of as-
sortment level in biofilms as discussed in the following subsection
and secondly, Section 4 presents the analysis with the inclusion of
degree of assortment.
3.1 Population dynamics in biofilms: A repli-
cator system
In this subsection, the steady states of a microbial colony for
different micro-environmental conditions are investigated without
consideration of spatial pattern. These equilibrium points are cal-
culated from the EGT-based replicator dynamics [11, 22] of coop-
erators and defectors. The replicator equation [11] for x and y with
x+ y 6= 1 can be written as
x˙ =x( fC− f¯ ) = x[(1− x) fC− y fD]
y˙ =y( fD− f¯ ) = y[(1− y) fD− x fC],
(1)
where fC and fD are the average fitness of cooperators and defec-
tors, respectively. f¯ = x fC + y fD is the average fitness of the mi-
crobial population in ensemble. The standard replicator equation
in (1) manifests the fitness-dependent growth of a subpopulation.
A subpopulation using strategies with a fitness greater than the av-
erage fitness ensures increased growth rate while a subpopulation
following strategies with lesser fitness than average diminishes in
number [11]. In the proposed stability analysis, we use this replica-
tor system as a framework because the fitness-dependent growth of
a subpopulation also supports the bacterial proliferation in public
goods competition in microbial biofilms [11].
The fitness (i.e. proliferation rate) of a competing strain primar-
ily depends on the amount of resource acquired in competition and
the metabolic cost of public goods production. Hence, the fitness
functions [14] in (1), fC and fD can be defined as
fC =
rc
N
(N−1)x− c(1− r
N
)
and fD =
rc
N
(N−1)x, (2)
where c is the metabolic cost of production, rc is the total contribu-
tion by a single cooperator to a common pool with multiplication
factor r > 1 (as suggested for ecological public goods games in
[12, 13, 14]), N denotes the total population size, and N > 1. The
expression for resource acquired by a center cooperator is RC =
(NC−1)rc
N , where NC is the total number of cooperators in the en-
semble. The fraction of producers around the center cooperator is
x = NC−1N−1 , which gives NC = xN−x+1. Substituting NC in the ex-
pression of RC gives rcN (N− 1)x, which is the amount of resource
acquired by a center producer from neighboring (NC−1) coopera-
tors. The net metabolic cost of production towards the cooperator
is σ = c− rcN = c(1− rN ). Therefore, the fitness of a cooperator is
the difference between resource acquired and net metabolic cost of
cooperation as denoted in the expression of fC in (2). The contri-
bution of defectors towards the public goods production is zero, i.e.
σ = 0 in the expression of fD.
For x+ y = 1, the solutions of the equation (1) are x = 11+C′1eσt
and y = 11+C′2e−σt
, where C′1, C
′
2 are the integration constants, and
C′1, C
′
2 > 0, therefore, defectors dominate when public goods pro-
ducers get a lesser return (from its own production) than production
cost ( rcN < c ⇒ r <N). Conversely, pathogenic (to the hosts) coop-
erators take over the population whenever return exceeds the cost
(r > N) [38]. Hence, for a system with only cooperators and de-
fectors, there is two stable states (0,1) and (1,0) for r < N and
r > N, respectively. In a control point of view, eradication of in-
fectious biofilm in a system with x+y = 1 [38] implies the switch-
ing of stable equilibrium from (1,0) to (0,1) (domination of pub-
lic goods non-producers) by any external influence (drug). There-
fore, it might be a bit easier to control such a system with only
cooperative and defective strains. On the contrary, in the proposed
system with non-participating strains, coexisting with public goods
producers and non-producers, we determined (1,0) (domination of
public goods producers) as only the global stable equilibrium. This
global domination of cooperators states a considerable difficulty in
the eradication of pathogenic biofilms compares to the system in
literature [14, 38] as the cooperators predominantly influence the
chronic bacterial infections towards the hosts.
We consider A = rcN (N−1) and B = c(1− rN ). Hence, the corre-
sponding fitness functions in (2) can be redefined in terms of A and
B as
fC = Ax−B, fD = Ax. (3)
By substituting (3) in (1), the modified dynamics is defined as
x˙ =x[(Ax−B)(1− x)−Axy]
y˙ =y[x(A+B−Ax)−Axy]. (4)
Fixed points of the replicator system in (4) are calculated using
x˙ = 0, y˙ = 0, which manifests the equilibrium points as (x∗,y∗) =
(0,0), (0,1+ BA ), (1,0), (
B
A ,0), and a line of fixed points, x
∗+y∗ =
1. The system in (4) contains an infinite number of fixed points
in the form (0,y∗), which are unstable due to the absence of co-
operators [9]. However, we analyze the equilibrium points (0,0),
(0,1+ BA ) and (0,1) as these are directly obtained from (4). In the
process of evaluating the fixed points from (4), a system of equa-
tions can be written as
(Ax−B)(1− x)−Axy =0
x(A+B−Ax)−Axy =0. (5)
By solving (5), we can write B= 0, which implies r=N as c> 0.
Moreover, B = 0 in (5) results x+ y = 1 as A > 0 and x 6= 0 for the
system of equations in (5). Hence, the microbial ensemble com-
prises cooperators and defectors only (no non-participating strains)
for r = N. In other words, the solution of (5), i.e. x+y = 1 is a line
of fixed points, which is a special case of (4) for r = N.
3.2 Investigation of the stability of equilibrium
points using the method of linearization
The stability of previously calculated fixed points is investigated
for the proposed dynamics as defined in (4). The replicator dynam-
ics in (4) can be redefined as
x˙ = f (x,y) =−Ax3 +(A+B)x2−Ax2y−Bx
y˙ =g(x,y) =−Axy2−Ax2y+(A+B)xy.
(6)
The method of linearization using Jacobian in the neighborhood
of equilibrium points is used to investigate the stability of the sys-
tem with respect to the fixed points. The Jacobian matrix, J can be
expressed from the replicator system in (6) as
J =
[ ∂ f
∂x
∂ f
∂y
∂g
∂x
∂g
∂y
]
, (7)
where
∂ f
∂x
=−3Ax2 +2(A+B)x−2Axy−B, ∂ f
∂y
=−Ax2,
∂g
∂x
=−Ay2 +(A+B)y−2Axy, ∂g
∂y
=−Ax2 +(A+B)x−2Axy.
(8)
3.2.1 Analysis of fixed point (x∗ = 0, y∗ = 0)
(x∗,y∗) = (0,0) signifies the microbial colony solely comprises
non-competing strains. The Jacobian matrix, J for (0,0) is calcu-
lated using (7) and (8) as
J(0,0) =
[ −B 0
0 0
]
. (9)
τ(0,0) =−B = −c(1− rN ) and ∆(0,0) = 0, where τ and ∆ denote
the trace and determinant of J, respectively. For r < N, τ(0,0) < 0,
and for r > N, τ(0,0) > 0. ∆(0,0) = 0 for any relation between r and
N. (τ , ∆) analysis of the fixed point (0,0) represents the border-
line case, hence, the nature of (0,0) cannot be determined directly.
Moreover, the eigen values of J(0,0) are λ
(0,0)
1,2 = (−B, 0), and y = 0
and x= 0 are the corresponding eigen vectors. Here, λ ( j,k)i denotes
ith eigen value of Jacobian, J( j,k) for ( j,k) equilibrium point. For
r < N, λ (0,0)1 < 0 and for r > N, λ
(0,0)
1 > 0, therefore, the eigen
vector y = 0 converges to (0,0) for r < N and diverges from (0,0)
for r > N. However, it is difficult to denote the nature (converging
or diverging) of eigen vector x = 0 for λ (0,0)2 = 0 from both (τ , ∆)
and eigen value analysis of J(0,0). Hence, for further analysis of
the nature of eigen vector x = 0, we use centre manifold theory [5,
1]. A parabolic manifold with centre at (0,0) and tangent to x = 0
can be defined as x = h(y) = h2y2. In the formulation of centre
manifold, the replicator dynamics in (6) is denoted as
x˙ = A′x+ f ′(x,y)
y˙ = B′y+g′(x,y).
(10)
By comparing (6) and (10), we can write A′=−B, f ′(x,y)=−Ax3+
(A+B)x2−Ax2y, B′ = 0 and g′(x,y)= −Axy2−Ax2y+(A+B)xy.
We use the following expression [34] to calculate h2 in the equation
of centre manifold h(y) = h2y2.
h˙(y)[B′y+g′(h(y),y)]−A′h(y)− f ′(h(y),y) = 0. (11)
By substituting the values of A′, B′, f ′ and g′ in (11), we can get
2h2y[−Ah22y5−Ah2y4 +(A+B)h2y3]+Bh2y2+
[Ah32y
6 +Ah22y
5− (A+B)h22y4] = 0.
(12)
Neglecting the higher order terms (h.o.ts) (>O(y2)) in (12), we
get Bh2y2 = 0⇒ h2 = 0 as B,y 6= 0 for the centre manifold. h2 = 0
gives the centre manifold expression as x = h(y) = h2y2 = 0. For
x = 0, we get the system dynamics from (6) as x˙ = y˙ = 0. Hence,
centre manifold x = 0 is an unstable manifold, and corresponding
fixed point (0,0) is an unstable node with respect to the centre man-
ifold x= 0. In place of h(y) = h2y2, if we consider the centre mani-
fold as x= h(y) = y+h2y2, we can get the expression after neglect-
ing h.o.ts from (11) as B(y+h2y2) = 0⇒ h2 =− 1y . h2 =− 1y gives
the centre manifold equation as x= 0, and corresponding dynamics
x˙ = y˙ = 0, which is same as previous. For r < N, the eigen vectors
y = 0 converges and x = 0 diverges, hence, (0,0) can be considered
as a saddle-node. But λ (0,0)2 = 0 signifies (0,0) is not a saddle for
r < N, can be considered as an unstable node. For r > N, both
the eigen vectors diverge from (0,0). Hence, (0,0) is an unstable
equilibrium point for both r < N and r > N.
3.2.2 Analysis of fixed point (x∗ = 0, y∗ = 1+ BA )
The equilibrium point (0,1+ BA ) signifies the absence of coop-
erators in the colony, and a fraction of defectors coexist with the
non-participating strains. The Jacobian matrix, J at the equilib-
rium point (0,1+ BA ) is J(0,1+ BA ) =
[ −B 0
0 0
]
, which is same
as J(0,0). τ(0,1+ BA )= −B = −c(1−
r
N ) and ∆(0,1+ BA ) = 0. (1+
B
A )
can be expressed in terms of r and N as
[
1+ N−rr(N−1)
]
, which is
greater than one for r < N, hence, (0,1+ BA ) is only a valid equi-
librium point for r > N as 0 ≤ x,y ≤ 1. For r > N, τ(0,1+ BA ) > 0
and ∆(0,1+ BA ) = 0. Eigen values of J(0,1+ BA ) are λ
(0,1+ BA )
1,2 = (−B, 0).
λ (0,1+
B
A )
1 > 0 for r > N, hence, corresponding eigen vector y = 0
diverges from (0,1+ BA ). To determine the nature of eigen vector
x = 0 for λ (0,1+
B
A )
2 = 0, we use centre manifold theory. The cor-
responding equation of parabolic manifold centered at (0,1+ BA )
and tangent to x = 0 is x = h(y) = h2(y−a)2, where a = (1+ BA ).
After neglecting h.o.ts, We can get the expression from (11) for
h(y) = h2(y−a)2 as
y2[5Ah32a
4−2Ah22a3 +Bh2]+
y[−4Ah32a5 +Ah22a4 +2(A+B)h22a3−2Bh2a]+
[Ah32a
6− (A+B)h22a4 +Bh2a2] = 0.
(13)
L.H.S of (13) is equal to zero if h2 = 0. Hence, the expression of
centre manifold x= h(y) = h2(y−a)2 = 0, and for x= 0, x˙= y˙= 0,
which manifests diverging eigen vector x = 0 of λ (0,1+
B
A )
2 = 0. For
r > N, eigen vectors (y = 0 and x = 0, respectively) corresponding
to the eigen values (−B,0) diverge from the fixed point, therefore,
(0,1+ BA ) is an unstable node.
3.2.3 Analysis of fixed point (x∗ = 1, y∗ = 0)
The fixed point (1,0) implies the sole domination of public goods
producers in biofilms. The Jacobian matrix, J at the fixed point
(1,0) is
J(1,0) =
[
B−A −A
0 B
]
. (14)
From (14), we can write τ(1,0) = 2B−A and ∆(1,0) = B(B−A).
τ(1,0) = (2B−A) = cN [N(2− r)− r] < 0 manifests the inequality
2
r < 1+
1
N , which is true as r,N > 1 and r,N ∈ Z. Hence, τ(1,0) < 0
for any relation between r and N. ∆(1,0) = B(B− A) = c
2
N (N −
r)(1− r), which is < 0 for r < N and > 0 for r > N. (τ2(1,0) −
4∆(1,0)) =A2 = [ rcN (N−1)]2, which is always > 0. Therefore, from
the (τ,∆) analysis, we can ensure that the equilibrium point (x∗ =
1, y∗ = 0) is a saddle point for r < N and a stable node for r >
N. Moreover, eigen values of J(1,0) are λ
(1,0)
1,2 = (B− A,B), and
corresponding eigen vectors are y= 0 and y=−x. λ (1,0)1 =B−A=
c(1− r), which is < 0 as c > 0 and r > 1. λ (1,0)2 = B = c(1− rN )
> 0 for r < N and < 0 for r > N. From the eigen value analysis
it is clear that the (1,0) is a saddle-node for r < N (as λ (1,0)1 < 0,
λ (1,0)2 > 0), and a stable equilibrium for r > N (as λ
(1,0)
1 , λ
(1,0)
2 <
0). Hence, both (τ,∆) and eigen value analysis of J(1,0) ensure the
same nature of (1,0) for r < N and r > N. The question remains is
that is (1,0) only stable or asymptotically stable equilibrium point
for r > N, and if asymptotically stable, then is it locally or globally
asymptotically stable? To investigate this question, we analyze the
point (1,0) using Lyapunov function candidate [31] as discussed in
the following.
Global asymptotic stability analysis of (x∗ = 1,y∗ = 0).
The Lyapunov function candidate, V (X) can be defined as
V (X) = XT PX , (15)
where the state variable X= [x y]T , P is a symmetric matrix with
principal minors greater than zero, i.e., P=
[
k1 k2
k2 k3
]
and k1, (k1k3−
k22)> 0. The elements of the matrix P can be determined from the
following Lyapunov equation [31].
PJ(1,0)+ J
T
(1,0)P =−Q, (16)
where J(1,0) is the Jacobian matrix at the equilibrium point (1,0) as
defined in (14), Q is a positive definite matrix, considered here as an
identity matrix, hence Q =
[
1 0
0 1
]
. By solving the Lyapunov
equation in (16), we can get the values of k1, k2 and k3 as
k1 =− 12(B−A) , k2 =
k1A
2B−A , k3 =
k1A2
B(2B−A) −
1
2B
. (17)
Now, the eigen values of P are defined as
λP1,2 =
τP±
√
τ2P−4∆P
2
, (18)
where τP = k1+k3 =− 12(B−A) − A
2
2B(B−A)(2B−A) − 12B , ∆P = k1k3−
k22 =
[(
k1A
2B−A
)2(B−A
B
)]
+ 14B(B−A) .
τP and ∆P are > 0 for r >N as B−A= c(1−r)< 0, (2B−A)< 0
and for r > N, B < 0. Moreover, τ2P−4∆P = [(k1−k3)2+4k22]> 0.
As (τ2P−4∆P), ∆P > 0, we can write
√
τ2P−4∆P ∈ (0,τP), hence,
λP1,2 > 0, which implies P is a positive definite matrix. Lyapunov
stability theorem suggests that the system is asymptotically stable
(V˙ (X)< 0) with respect to the equilibrium point for which the ma-
trix P is positive definite [31]. In the proposed system, P(1,0) > 0
for r > N, hence, at this juncture we can say that the system is lo-
cally asymptotically stable with respect to the fixed point (1,0) for
r > N. By substituting (17) in (15), V (x,y) can be defined (after
coordinate transformation) as
V (x,y) =k1(x−1)2 +2k2(x−1)y+ k3y2
=k1
[
(x−1)2 + 2A
2B−A (x−1)y+
A2y2
B(2B−A)
]
− y
2
2B
.
(19)
From (19) it is clear that V (1,0) = 0 and V (\X = (1,0)) > 0 as
k1, k2(x− 1) > 0, and for r > N, k3 > 0. Hence, the necessary
conditions for Lyapunov candidate function are satisfied. V˙ (X) can
be expressed as
V˙ (X) =
[∂V
∂X
]T
X˙
=−2k1Ax4 +2k1(2A+B)x3−2k1(A+2B)x2 +2k1Bx−
(2k1A+4k2A)x3y+[2k1A+2k2(3A+2B)]x2y−
(4k2A+2k3A)x2y2− (A+2B)xy+
[2k2A+2k3(A+B)]xy2−2k3Axy3.
(20)
The expressions of V (X) and V˙ (X) as denoted in (19) and (20),
respectively are simulated for r < N and r > N in Fig. 1. From Fig.
1 (c) and (d), it is clear that V (X) is radially unbounded [34] and
V˙ (X)< 0 for r > N, respectively. Hence, we can conclude that the
equilibrium point (1,0) is globally asymptotically stable for r > N,
whereas (1,0) is not a stable equilibrium for r < N as V (X) < 0
and V˙ (X)> 0 (Fig. 1 (a) and (b), respectively).
3.2.4 Analysis of fixed point (x∗ = BA , y∗ = 0)
The equilibrium state (BA ,0) represents the absence of defectors
in the colony, and cooperators coexist with the non-participating
strains. The Jacobian matrix, J at the equilibrium point (BA ,0) is
J( BA ,0) =
[
B(1− BA ) −B
2
A
0 B
]
. (21)
For r > N, BA =
N−r
r(N−1) < 0, hence, (
B
A ,0) is only a valid fixed
point for r < N. τ( BA ,0) = 2B−
B2
A = 2c(1− rN )− c(N−r)
2
rN(N−1) > 0 im-
plies the inequality N(2− 1r ) > 1, which is true as r,N > 1 and
r ∈ Z, hence, τ( BA ,0) > 0 for r < N. ∆( BA ,0) = B
2(1− BA ) = c2(1−
r
N )
2
[
N(r−1)
r(N−1)
]
> 0, and (τ2
( BA ,0)
−4∆( BA ,0)) = (
B2
A )
2 > 0. Therefore,
from (τ,∆) analysis, it is clear that the fixed point (BA ,0) is an unsta-
ble node for r < N. Moreover, eigen values of J( BA ,0) are λ
( BA ,0)
1,2 =
(B(1− BA ), B). For r < N, both λ
( BA ,0)
1 = B(1− BA ) = c(N−r)(r−1)r(N−1)
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Figure 1: (Color online) Simulation of the expressions of V (X) and
V˙ (X) as formulated in (19) and (20), respectively for r < N and
r > N. For r < N, (a) V (X) < 0 and (b) V˙ (X) > 0. For r > N, (c)
V (X)> 0 and it is radially unbounded and (d) V˙ (X)< 0
and λ (
B
A ,0)
2 = B = c(1− rN ) are > 0, hence, eigen value analysis
also ensured that (BA ,0) is an unstable equilibrium for r < N.
3.2.5 Analysis of fixed point (x∗ = 0, y∗ = 1)
The fixed state (0,1) suggests the ‘full dominance of defectors’
in the colony. We analyze the fixed point (0,1) as it is one of the
boundary solutions to x∗+ y∗ = 1. The Jacobian matrix, J at (0,1)
is
J(0,1) =
[ −B 0
B 0
]
. (22)
Eigen values of J(0,1) are λ
(0,1)
1,2 = (−B, 0), and corresponding
eigen vectors are y =−x and x = 0. λ (0,1)1 =−B =−c(1− rN )< 0
for r < N and > 0 for r > N. Hence, the eigen vector y = −x
converges to (0,1) for r < N, and diverges from the fixed point
for r > N. Next, we investigate the nature of eigen vector x =
0 corresponding to eigen value λ (0,1)2 = 0 using centre manifold
theory as discussed in subsections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2.
The parabolic manifold centered at (0,1) and tangent to x = 0
can be considered as x = h(y) = h2(y−1)2. To calculate the value
of h2, we use equation (11), and corresponding expression after
neglecting h.o.ts is
y2[5Ah32−2Ah22 +Bh2]+ y[−4Ah32 +3Ah22 +2Bh22−2Bh2]+
[Ah32− (A+B)h22 +Bh2] = 0.
(23)
Equation (23) resembles (13) with a = 1. The solution to (23) is
h2 = 0, which gives the centre manifold as x = 0, and correspond-
ing system dynamics is x˙ = y˙ = 0. Therefore, x = 0 is an unstable
manifold, and diverges from the equilibrium point (0,1). Hence,
for both r < N and r > N, (0,1) is an unstable fixed point.
The summary of the stability analysis of fixed points (as dis-
cussed in subsections 3.2.1 to 3.2.5) is tabulated in Table 1.
Phase portraits for r < N and r > N are simulated in Fig. 2.
For this simulation, we consider the proposed dynamics as formu-
lated in (6). Though for r < N, all the initial conditions converge
Table 1: Summary of stability analysis of fixed points
Fixed points Nature of fixed points
r < N r > N
(0,0) Unstable node Unstable node
(0,1+ BA ) Not valid Unstable node
(1,0) Saddle-node Globally asymptoticallystable node
(BA ,0) Unstable node Not valid
(0,1) Unstable node Unstable node
to the equilibrium point (0,1) (figure (a)), for r << N the stability
of (0,1) does not hold true as depicted in figure (b). Hence, for
r < N, (0,1) is an unstable equilibrium. Whereas figures (c) and
(d) confirm (1,0) as globally asymptotically stable equilibrium for
both r > N and r >> N, hence, (1,0) is only the globally asymp-
totically stable fixed point for the proposed dynamical system. The
dynamics of the fraction of cooperators and defectors are simulated
from (6), and the results are depicted in Fig. 3. Fig. 3 clearly states
that (1,0) is globally stable for r > N ((c) and (d)), whereas (0,1)
is an unstable node for r < N ((a) and (b)). The simulation results
in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 match with the stability analysis of equilibrium
points as discussed in subsections 3.2.1 to 3.2.5.
Although (1,0) is a globally asymptotically stable equilibrium
for r > N, for r < N, the fixed point (1,0) is a saddle-node as dis-
cussed in the subsection 3.2.3, and corresponding phase portrait
(zoomed in the neighborhood of (1,0)) is depicted in Fig. 4 (a).
For r =N, the proposed dynamics in (6) converges to x+y= 1, i.e.
the microbial colony consists of cooperators and defectors only.
The simulated phase portrait for r =N is shown in Fig. 4 (b) which
ensures the convergence of the system towards x+ y = 1.
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Figure 2: (Color online) Phase portraits for (a) r < N, (b) r << N,
(c) r > N and (d) r >> N. and denote initial conditions and
equilibrium point(s), respectively.
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Figure 3: (Color online) Simulation of dynamics of x and y from
(6). (a) (x∗, y∗)= (0,1) is the stable equilibrium for r < N, (b) (0,1)
is an unstable fixed point for r << N as the fraction of defectors
converge to different steady states depending on the initial condi-
tions. (x∗, y∗)= (1,0) is the stable fixed point for (c) r > N and (d)
r >> N. Legend of figure (a) is applicable to the figures (b), (c)
and (d).
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Figure 4: (Color online) (a) The equilibrium point (1,0) is a saddle
for r < N, (b) proposed dynamical system in (6) converges to the
line x+ y = 1 for r = N. and denote initial conditions and
equilibrium points, respectively.
3.3 Inference from the above analysis
From the previous stability analysis, it is clear that the fixed point
(1,0) is only a globally asymptotically stable equilibrium for r > N
for the proposed dynamics in (6). The equilibrium point (1,0) sig-
nifies that the microbial colony is dominated by the public goods
producers (so called cooperators), which are primarily responsi-
ble for the persistence of microbial infections [3, 24]. Due to the
asymptotically stable nature of the equilibrium point (1,0), the mi-
crobial system has an inherent tendency to occupy the whole con-
sortium by the pathogenic cooperators, and this is the reason for
the difficulty in the eradication of infectious biofilms.
4. ANALYSIS OF REPLICATOR DYNAM-
ICS WITH SPATIAL PATTERN
In the previous section, we discussed the stability analysis of the
equilibrium points of the replicator system in (1) using the fitness
functions as defined in (2). In this stability analysis, the payoff ex-
pressions in (2) do not contain any parameter(s) which signify the
degree of assortment, present in microbial biofilms. As a result of
the previous analysis, a single fixed point (1,0) (‘full dominance
of cooperators’) satisfies the condition for global asymptotic stabil-
ity. In the present section, we extend the previous discussion via
inclusion of degree of assortment in the fitness functions of cooper-
ators and defectors. The purpose of including the spatial pattern in
the proposed analysis is twofold: (a) emergence of cooperation in
a population with phenotypic heterogeneity facilitates spatial pat-
terns in microbial ecosystems [30], and (b) the degree of assort-
ment can be controlled externally with the variation of initial cell
density [35]. Hence, it could be interesting to visualize the effect
of level of segregation on the population dynamics of cooperative
and defective strains. Segregation in biofilms favors cooperative
cell lines as the cooperators more often interact with their lineages,
and high level of assortment resists exploitation of public goods by
the noncooperative ‘cheaters’ [16, 25]. On the contrary, defectors
are advantaged in well-mixed colony. To define the fitness func-
tions with the consideration of spatial patterns, as formulated in
(24), ζ and β are added as an intrinsic advantage to the cooperators
and defectors, respectively, and ζ ,β > 0. Therefore, ζ > β defines
segregated biofilms, whereas, β > ζ ensures well-mixed.
fC =
[
rc
N
(N−1)x− c
(
1− r
N
)]
(1+ζ ) = (Ax−B)(1+ζ )
fD =
[
rc
N
(N−1)x
]
(1+β ) = Ax(1+β ).
(24)
By substituting the payoff expressions (24) in the replicator equa-
tion (1), we can write the dynamics of cooperative and defective
strains in a segregated or well-mixed colony with non-participating
strains as
x˙ =x
[
(1− x)(Ax−B)(1+ζ )−Axy(1+β )]
y˙ =y
[
x{A(1+β )− (Ax−B)(1+ζ )}−Axy(1+β )]. (25)
The equilibrium points, (x∗,y∗), are calculated from (25) using
x˙=0 and y˙=0 as (0,0),
(
0,1+ B(1+ζ )A(1+β )
)
, (0,1), (1,0),
(B
A ,0
)
and
the point of coexistence (x∗c ,y∗c)=
(
B(1+ζ )
A(ζ−β ) ,1+
B(1+ζ )
A(β−ζ )
)
. The dy-
namics in (25) contains infinite number of fixed points in the form
(0,y∗) where y∗ ∈ [0,1], however, an ecological public goods game
with non-participating strains (i.e. average fitness of the popula-
tion is dominated by only the competing strains) does not hold any
asymptotically stable equilibrium in the absence of public goods
producers [9]. Even though we analyze the fixed points (0,0),(
0,1+ B(1+ζ )A(1+β )
)
as these are directly calculated from the dynam-
ics in (25), and we consider (0,1) as it is a boundary value of the
infinite set of equilibrium states. A notable difference between the
dynamics in (4) and (25) is that the incorporation of the level of
assortment induces a unique point of coexistence [11, 22] between
the competing strains.
Four possible cases are considered for the analysis of population
dynamics in (25) - case I: r < N,β > ζ implies return is less to the
cooperators than the metabolic cost of cooperation in a well-mixed
biofilm, case II: r > N,ζ > β manifests return is greater than the
cost of cooperation in a segregated biofilm, case III: r < N,ζ > β
denotes return is less than the meatbolic cost in an assorted biofilm,
and case IV: r > N,β > ζ signifies the return is greater than the
cooperative cost in a well-mixed biofilm. Population dynamics of
cooperators and defectors are simulated from (25) for the case I to
case IV in the scenario x+y < 1, and corresponding results are de-
picted in Fig. 5 for a set of parameters r, N, ζ and β .
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Figure 5: (Color online) Simulation of dynamics of x and y from
(25). (a) Defectors dominate for r < N, β > ζ ; (b) Cooperators
dominate for r > N, ζ > β ; (c) and (d) The domination of cooper-
ators or defectors depends on the relation between initial fraction
and level of coexistence for r < N, ζ > β ; (e) Coexistence between
cooperators and defectors for r > N, β > ζ . Legend of figure (a) is
applicable to the figures (b), (c) and (e).
From Fig. 5 (a), it is clear that the lesser return to the cooperators
than the metabolic cost of production in well-mixed biofilms (case
I) favors defectors, whereas, the greater return than the cost of co-
operation in segregated biofilms (case II) supports cooperators as
depicted in (b). Fig. 5 (c, d) present bistability (winning of cooper-
ators or defectors depend on the initial fraction) when the return is
less than the cost of cooperation in assorted biofilms (case III), and
Fig. 5 (e) illustrates coexistence in a well-mixed colony with the
greater return to the cooperators compared to the metabolic cost of
public goods production (case IV). However, (0,1) is not an asymp-
totically stable equilibrium point for a replicator system with non-
competing strains as discussed previously. Therefore, the stable
(0,1) as shown in Fig. 5 (a) and (c) may not be stable for the other
set of (r,N,ζ ,β ), even though, that set satisfies the relation for the
cases I and III. The point of coexistence is also not a stable state in
the entire domain of case IV as shown in Fig. 6. It is shown that
coexistence persist for (r,N,ζ ,β ) = (100,50,0.05,0.07), however,
the dynamics moves to another steady state (1,0) while (r,N) =
(100,20) and (ζ ,β ) is unchanged. Therefore, the stability condi-
tions of the equilibrium points for the valid cases are necessary to
investigate further. Conditions for the stability of the fixed states
(1,0) and (x∗c ,y∗c) are discussed in the following subsection.
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Figure 6: (Color online) Dynamics of x and y for the case IV. (a)
Coexistence occurs with (r,N,ζ ,β ) = (100,50,0.05,0.07) and (b)
Cooperators dominate for (r,N,ζ ,β ) = (100,20,0.05,0.07).
4.1 Stability conditions of (1,0) and (x∗c ,y∗c)
The replicator dynamics in (25) can be written alternatively as
x˙ =−A(1+ζ )x3 +[(A+B)(1+ζ )−A(1+β )y]x2−B(1+ζ )x
y˙ =−A(1+ζ )x2y+[A(1+β )+B(1+ζ )]xy−A(1+β )xy2.
(26)
In the next subsections, we investigate the stability conditions of
the fixed points (1,0) and (x∗c ,y∗c) using linear stability analysis via
calculating the Jacobian from (26).
4.1.1 Stability condition for (1,0)
The Jacobian matrix of (1,0) is calculated from the dynamics in
(26) as
J′(1,0) =
[
(B−A)(1+ζ ) −A(1+β )
0 (B−A)(1+ζ )+A(1+β )
]
. (27)
The eigen values of J′(1,0) are λ
′(1,0)
1 = (B−A)(1+ζ ) = −(1+
ζ )c(r−1) and λ ′(1,0)2 =(B−A)(1+ζ )+A(1+β )=−(1+ζ )c(r−
1)+(1+β )( rcN (N−1)). λ
′(1,0)
1 is always < 0 as c,ζ > 0 and r > 1,
whereas for the stability of (1,0), λ ′(1,0)2 < 0, which gives a unique
inequality for the four individual cases as(
ζ −β
1+ζ
)
+
(
1+β
1+ζ
)
1
N
>
1
r
. (28)
Hence, (1,0) is a stable equilibrium if the inequality condition in
(28) holds, and (1,0) is a saddle if
(
ζ−β
1+ζ
)
+
(
1+β
1+ζ
)
1
N <
1
r .
4.1.2 Stability condition for (x∗c ,y∗c)
The point of coexistence (x∗c ,y∗c) is an invalid fixed point for the
case I and case II. The Jacobian for (x∗c ,y∗c) is calculated from the
dynamics in (26) as
J′(x∗c ,y∗c) =

−C1 +C4 −C2
C1 +C3 C2
(
1+ C3C1
)
 , (29)
where C1 =
B2(1+ζ )3
A(β−ζ )2 , C2 =C1
( 1+β
1+ζ
)
, C3 =
B(1+ζ )2
β−ζ , C4 =B(1+ζ ).
The eigen values of J′(x∗c ,y∗c) are λ
′(x∗c ,y∗c)
1 =
(1+β )(1+ζ )B
β−ζ and λ
′(x∗c ,y∗c)
2 =
B2(1+ζ )2
A(β−ζ ) +B(1+ζ ). λ
′(x∗c ,y∗c)
1 < 0 for the cases III and IV. For case
III, λ ′(x
∗
c ,y
∗
c)
2 < 0 and x
∗
c < 1 gives the inequality
N−r
ζ−β >
r(N−1)
1+ζ and
N−r
ζ−β <
r(N−1)
1+ζ , respectively which are contradicting each other.
Hence, for case III, λ ′(x
∗
c ,y
∗
c)
2 > 0, which intends that the point of
coexistence is a saddle-node for r < N,ζ > β . However, for case
IV, λ ′(x
∗
c ,y
∗
c)
2 < 0 and x
∗
c < 1 denote the same inequality condition as
N− r
ζ −β <
r(N−1)
1+ζ
. (30)
Therefore, (x∗c ,y∗c) is a stable steady state if the inequality condi-
tion in (30) satisfies for the case IV.
A system with only cooperative and defective strains is a special
case of our previous discussion with non-participating strains. For
x+ y = 1, full dominance of cooperators and defectors ((1,0) and
(0,1), respectively) are asymptotically stable for the case I and case
II, respectively. Both (1,0) and (0,1) are stable for case III (bista-
bility) if the inequality ζ−β
(1+ζ ) −
(N−r)
r(N−1) > 0 holds, and the point of
coexistence (x∗c ,1−x∗c) is stable for the case IV upon satisfying the
inequality condition ζ−β
(1+ζ ) −
(N−r)
r(N−1) < 0. The population dynamics
of cooperators for x+ y = 1 is simulated from (25) by substituting
y = 1− x, and corresponding snapshots from the video simulation
are depicted in Fig. 7. The results in Fig. 7 satisfy the discussed
stable steady states for the four cases in a special scenario x+y= 1.
The summary of stability analysis of the fixed points for the sys-
tem in (25) (x+y< 1) is tabulated in Table 2. The stability analysis
of the equilibrium states other than (1,0) and (x∗c ,y∗c) are discussed
in the supplementary material.
4.2 Inference from the above analysis
•Consideration of the degree of assortment [35] introduces bista-
bility [11] and coexistence [11] in a microbial biofilm. When return
to the cooperators is less than the cost of production in a segregated
colony, the dominance of cooperators or defectors depends on its
initial population density (case III: bistability). Whereas the colony
goes into a stable mixed steady-state (case IV: coexistence) when
the return is more in a well-mixed biofilm. Coexistence occurs as
the perfect defection (i.e. cooperators stop the production of public
goods or defectors fully exploit the goods produced by the cooper-
ators) is not a suitable strategy towards the long-term existence for
both the strains [9].
• The replicator system [11] with the inclusion of both spatial
pattern [35] and non-competing strains [8] does not show global
asymptotic stability. As a result, we got the conditions for the
dominance of cooperators and coexistence. Therefore, there is a
scope to regulate the system parameters (here r, N, c, ζ , β ) such
that the inequality condition (equation (28)) for the appropriation
of pathogenic (from the viewpoint of hosts) cooperators violates -
can be a novel strategy for the eradication of infectious biofilms.
• The outcomes of four cases (see Fig. 5 and Fig. 7) resemble
four different games [11] - prisoners’ dilemma (PD), harmony (H),
coordination game (CG) and snowdrift game (SD) as shown in Fig.
8.
5. CONCLUSION
Phenotypic and genotypic heterogeneity in the bacterial colony
is a driving force for analyzing the dynamics of the constituent pop-
ulation [39]. Therefore, the impact of social interactions [28, 17,
42] between these heterotypic strains is obligatory for the inves-
tigation of microbial population dynamics [39, 20]. In addition,
stability analysis of the population structure is one of the best ways
to find the underlying dominant strategy present in the colony [20].
In the support of the above statements, in this paper, we analyze
the inherent population dynamics of a microbial biofilm in a com-
bined framework of EGT [11] and nonlinear control theory [34].
Table 2: Summary of stability analysis of fixed points with assortment
Fixed points Nature of fixed points
Case I
r < N,β > ζ
Case II
r > N,ζ > β
Case III
r < N,ζ > β
Case IV
r > N,β > ζ
(0,0) Unstable node Unstable node Unstable node Unstable node(
0,1+ B(1+ζ )A(1+β )
)
Not valid Unstable node Not valid Unstable node
(1,0) Stable nodeif (28) holds true
(BA ,0) Unstable node Not valid Unstable node Not valid
(0,1) Unstable node Unstable node Unstable node Unstable node(
B(1+ζ )
A(ζ−β ) ,1+
B(1+ζ )
A(β−ζ )
)
Not valid Not valid Saddle-node Stable nodeif (30) holds true
t=0 t=6 t=12
a1 a2 a3
b1 b2 b3
c1 c2 c3
d1 d2 d3
e1 e2 e3
Figure 7: (Color online) Snapshots from the video simulation of
the four different cases for x+ y = 1. Time steps are mentioned at
the top of the figure. (a1-a3) Case I: Defectors dominate, (b1-b3)
Case II: Cooperators dominate, (c1-c3) Case III with initial frac-
tion of cooperators as 0.4: Domination of defectors, (d1-d3) Case
III with initial fraction of cooperators as 0.6: Domination of co-
operators, (e1-e3) Case IV: Coexistence between cooperators and
defectors. Initial fraction of cooperators is taken as 0.9, 0.1 and 0.1
for the case I, case II and case IV, respectively. and denote
cooperator and defector, respectively.
PD
CG H
SD
r N
 
Figure 8: (Color online) Schematic diagram of four possible games
in biofilms. Case I (r < N,β > ζ ) defines the winning of defectors,
can be modeled as PD game. Case II (r > N,ζ > β ) signifies the
domination of cooperators which resembles H game. Case III (r <
N,ζ > β ) shows bistability, similar to CG. And case IV (r >N,β >
ζ ) denotes coexistence as similar to SD game. and denote the
subpopulation of cooperator and defector, respectively.
Our analysis of this replicator system with “inactive alleles” [8] is
twofold: with consideration of spatial pattern [35] and without in-
clusion of the assortment level. Former shows the ‘full dominance
of pathogenic cooperators’ as a global asymptotic stable equilib-
rium which justifies the adversity in the eradication of infectious
biofilms. Whereas the latter introduces two additional cases - bista-
bility and coexistence, and also presents the conditional dominance
of cooperation and coexistence. Here, the outcomes of four pos-
sible cases resemble four different evolutionary games [11]. The
stability analysis developed for the proposed sociomicrobiological
system not only presents a standard framework for analyzing multi-
order, nonlinear population dynamics but also gives a clue to move
the system dynamics to a desired steady state with external super-
vision (drug) for controlling the bacterial pathogenicity [3, 40].
In future, we will work on the modeling and analysis of the repli-
cator system for an inhomogeneous and variable sized population.
Further investigation is required to find out the significance of r > 1
and r >N in biofilms, and for this analysis, we may need to include
non-competing-type public goods producers (e.g. altruists) in the
microbial population. One major challenge is to verify this analysis
through wet lab experiments by tagging cooperators and defectors
with fluorescent proteins. This would help in observing the dynam-
ics, and provide valuable insights for further analysis of the system
as well as assist in designing better therapeutic control measures.
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APPENDIX
A. SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
A.1 Stability analysis of equilibrium points with
spatial pattern
A.1.1 Analysis of (0,0) and (0,1)
The Jacobian matrix for the fixed point (0,0) is calculated from
the dynamics in (26) as J′(0,0) =
[ −B(1+ζ ) 0
0 0
]
. The eigen
values of J′(0,0) are λ
′(0,0)
1 = −B(1+ ζ ) = −c(1− rN )(1+ ζ ) and
λ ′(0,0)2 = 0. The eigen vectors corresponding to λ
′(0,0)
1 and λ
′(0,0)
2
are y = 0 and x = 0, respectively. For r < N, λ ′(0,0)1 < 0 and
for r > N, λ ′(0,0)1 > 0. To say about the nature of eigen vector
x = 0 for λ ′(0,0)2 = 0, a parabolic manifold centre at (0,0) is taken
as x = h(y) = h2y2. The value of h2 is calculated from (11) by
substituting x = h2y2. We get the parameters A′, B′, f ′ and g′ in
(11) by comparing (10) and (26) as A′ = −B(1+ ζ ), B′ = 0, f ′ =
−A(1+ ζ )x3 + [(A+B)(1+ ζ )−A(1+ β )y]x2 and g′ = −A(1+
ζ )x2y+ [A(1+ β ) + B(1+ ζ )]xy− A(1+ β )xy2. Hence, the ex-
pression from (11) can be written as
(1+ζ )Bh2y2 +O(y4,y5,y6) = 0 (31)
Similarly, we get the Jacobian from (26) for (0,1) as
J′(0,1)=
[ −B(1+ζ ) 0
B(1+ζ ) 0
]
. The eigen values of J′(0,1) are λ
′(0,1)
1 =
−B(1+ζ ) =−c(1− rN )(1+ζ ) and λ
′(0,1)
2 = 0, and corresponding
eigen vectors are y =−x and x = 0, respectively. The eigen vector
y = −x converges to (0,1) for r < N and diverges for r > N. As
similar to the analysis of the fixed point (0,0), a parbolic manifold
centre at (0,1), x = h(y) = h2(y−1)2, is taken to denote the nature
of eigen vector x = 0 for λ ′(0,1)2 = 0. Hence, after neglecting h.o.ts
(> O(y2)), the expression from (11) can be written as
y2[5A(1+ζ )h32 +{8A(1+β )+(4B−2A)(1+ζ )}h22 +B(1+ζ )h2]
+ y[−4A(1+ζ )h32−{A(1+β )+2B(1+ζ )}h22−2(1+ζ )Bh2]+
[A(1+ζ )h32− (A+B)(1+ζ )h22 +B(1+ζ )h2] = 0
(32)
The expressions in (31) and (32) are equal to zero if h2 = 0, there-
fore, the centre manifold for both the equilibrium points (0,0) and
(0,1) is x = 0, which intends the dynamics x˙ = 0 and y˙ = 0 as
calculated from (26). Hence, due to the constant nature of pop-
ulation density, it can be stated that fixed points (0,0) and (0,1)
are unstable for any parameters set of (r,N,ζ ,β ) in a colony with
non-participating strains.
A.1.2 Analysis of
(
0,1+ B(1+ζ )A(1+β )
)
and (BA ,0)
The equilibrium point
(
0,1+ B(1+ζ )A(1+β )
)
is represented here as
(0,1+ p), where p= B(1+ζ )A(1+β ) . The condition to make (0,1+ p) as a
valid fixed point is p= (1+ζ )(N−r)
(1+β )r(N−1) < 0. Hence, (0,1+ p) is an in-
valid fixed point for the case I and case III. The Jacobian for (0,1+
p) can be denoted as J′(0,1+p) =
[ −B(1+ζ ) 0
0 0
]
. J′(0,1+p) is
same as J′(0,0). Hence, further analysis of (0,1+ p) using centre
manifold theory will be the same as discussed in A.1.1. The only
difference - manifold expression for (0,1+ p) is h2(y− 1− p)2.
The further analysis defines (0,1+ p) as an unstable fixed point.
The equilibrium point (BA ,0) is a valid steady state for case I
and case III as BA =
N−r
r(N−1) < 0 for the cases II and IV. The in-
equality BA < 1 denotes N(r− 1) > 0, which is always true for
r,N > 1, hence, for the cases I and III, 0 < BA < 1. The Jaco-
bian for (BA ,0) is expressed from the dynamics (26) as J
′
( BA ,0)
=[
B(1− BA )(1+ζ ) −B
2
A (1+β )
0 B(1+β )
]
. The eigen values of J′
( BA ,0)
are
λ ′(
B
A ,0)
1 =
(1+ζ )c(r−1)(N−r)
r(N−1) and λ
′( BA ,0)
2 = (1+ β )c(1− rN ). For
r < N, λ ′(
B
A ,0)
1 > 0 and λ
′( BA ,0)
2 > 0, therefore, it can be concluded
that (BA ,0) is an unstable fixed point for case I and case III.
